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Appeal from the District Court of the Seventh Judicial District 
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Honorable Dane H. Watkins, District Judge, presiding 
Stephen D. Hall and Nathan M. Olsen 
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This case arises out of the same series of transactions described in Phase Investments 
1'. Jarvis. 153 Idaho 207. 280 710 (2012), in \vh1ch this Court held that a deed not signed by 
both spouses was potentially voidable, but not void. under Idaho ~ 32-912. this case. the 
lender. Snake River Funding, Inc., and its assignee, DAFCO LLC (collectively "the Lenders") sued 
Stewart Title Guaranty Company and Amerititle. (collectively "the Title Companies") claiming 
damages from Title resulti ng the title policy and against Amerititle 
resulting from breaches of the escrow agreement. also sought to add claims for neglIgence 
and for breach of the duty of good faith and t~lir dealing against the Companies, and to add a 
breach of warranty claim against Snake River Funding under its assignment. 
January] 5, the Lenders their complaint against this 
cause. l (Shortly thereafter the investments. supra. was commenced. 
filed a on 201 3 clari fying claims against 
Stewart Guaranty. 
21, judgment4 \vas denied 
by the trial court in January It on the grounds that, although the trial court in Phase 
JnrestmenlS had invalidated the Jarvis' s deed because it had not been signed by both spouses, 
1 R, p. 12. 
See Supreme Court Repository, Bonneville County Case CV -2010-651. 
R, p. 22. 
4 R, p. 93. 
7 
that the \vas still pending 5 the 
the court determined that the claims \vere not court 
refused to dismiss the case, as requested and on 11, it vacated all 
hearing and pending a on appeal Investments .Ii 
In the meantime, the Lenders filed a Second Amended Complaint on March] 1.2011, adding 
a claim against Amerititle, Inc which had aeted as the esero\v agent in the closing of the loan by the 
to 7 
complaint \vas 
of the 
that 
interest 111 
2L substitution 
on 
6 
pp. 357, 368-369. 
pp. 460-461. 
7 R., p. 426. 
8 R .. 
.. p. Il. 
case 
was 
. counsel 
'JLLUH ••• ) at a status 
9 Tr., p. 22, L. 19 p. L. 6: p. L1. 9-24. 
10 R., p. 464,466; Tr., p. 18, Lt. 14-21. 
II Tr., p. 23, LL 5-6. 
8 
the comi 
answer to the amended 
the outcome 
a conflict 
by Substitution 
had taken on the new claims and 
starting at ground zero 
to a 201 and 
Title and Amerititle moved judgment October 1 2012. 13 
to file a Third Complaint 6, 12. J4 
These motions. along with ancillary motions to strike and to continue. were argued 
December 1 201 At the heanng the trial court, considering all of the briefs and affidavits. ruled 
the It granted both motions for summary judgment and denied the plaintiff's motion to 
J < to were December 2012.16 
appeal 42 days later on February 4, 13, when filed Notice of 
J7 
The to this dispute is most this Court's opinion in New Phase 
Joshua and Rebecca were on June 30, 2006, and remained 
married throughout the proceedings belmv. Joshua acquired a piece real property 
in Is (the "Property") on 7, . Although the warranty deed 
conveyed the Property to Joshua as married man dealing with his and separate 
property," the parties do not dispute that it vvas community property. Joshua planned 
to build a spec home on the Property and, in furtherance of that end, obtained several 
construction usmg the Property as 
On March 1 2008, Joshua executed a deed of trust in favor of Snake River 
Funding. to secure the amount of$268.000, and that deed was later assigned to 
DAFCO, LLC The deed of trust was recorded in Bonneville County on March 18. 
12 R .. pp. 468, 580. 
l' R, pp. 471. 473 
14 R -8' 
.. , p.) .:... 
J 5 pp.42-93 
J6 R., pp. 689-693. 
17 R 694 
.. p. . 
9 
2008. It is undisputed did not join in the execution of this first-recorded 
trust deed. On April 3, 2008, Joshua obtained a $42,000 loan secured by another 
trust of Phase Investments, again without 
Rebecca's signature. 
Although Joshua defaulted on those obligations in the summer of2008, 
Phase agreed to loan him additional money secured by neVi deeds of trust. Joshua 
and Rebecca, acting together, executed two deeds of trust in favor ofNe\v Phase on 
October 28,2008, as well as a third deed of trust on November 3,2008. The trust 
deeds secured amounts of $42,000, $63,600, and $140,000, respectively, and \vere 
recorded in Bonneville County on their dates of execution. 18 
Amerititle \vas the escrow agent that closed the loan transaction between Jarvis and Snake 
Funding. 19 transaction involved several issues, as set forth the closing instructions 
prepared by Amerititlc. First. Amerititle recognized in the closing instructions that the closing would 
involve two steps. The first step was to execute the documents that created a loan from Snake River 
Funding to l\1r. Jarvis. The second step was to execute the documents that assigned Snake River 
Funding's interest in the loan to In other \vords, from the outset DAFCO was the real party 
in interest in this closing. That was patently obvious to all. The Closing Instructions 
from Snake Funding and to Amerititle state: "Please prepare the: Promissory Note, Deed 
Inc. to C 
documents.·,2o 
to the the parties to the transaction, the Closing Instructions 
followed the Commitment for Title Insurance issued by Amerititle. In particular, the Commitment 
for Title Insurance issued prior to Closing provided that title \vas vested in "Josh M. Jarvis. a married 
man dealing with his sole and separate property.',21 The same Commitment for Title Insurance 
18 New Phase Investments v. Jarvis, 153 Idaho at 208-209,280 P.3d at 711-712 
19 R .. p. 502, ~ 9 (AtTidavit of Megan Ker). 
20 R., p. 508 (Exhibit A to AtTidavit of Megan Ker) 
21 R., p. 434 ~ 4 (Exhibit A to verified Second Amended Complaint) 
10 
vestee hereinjoin 
m to 
Community iJrl,nc','n presumption.,·n Presumably, this \vouldhave one of the necessary 
documents" referenced in the Closing lnstructions, as set forth 
Under the Closing Instructions, Amerititle was not authorized to close the transaction until 
it "has received all properly executed documents. "23 The parties were entitled to assume that the 
properly executed documents \vouJd include the signature on the conveyance or 
as set out 
At the closing, Amerititle did not obtain the signature Mrs. Jarvis, either on the 
of Trust or on another instrument in vvhich she disclaiming any interest in the property. Indeed, 
that failure \vas at the heart the litigation in Phase investments, as it is in this case. 
In short. Ameritile was the escrow or improperly prepared documents 
showing that title \vas in Joshua and of as . 
community property. 11 prepared deed trust mcluding a Jarvis. It 
prepared the closing' and to the parties to sign 
at the closing of the in question. as is ubiquitous in such transactions, the parties relied on 
Amerititle, as the "vr,?W'f that was nel:;es,sa! to the title and 
the documents right at closing so that the loan could be insured without any cloud or encumbrance 
other than those listed on the title commitment and, ultimately, on the title insurance policy. Those 
failures led to the deed of trust being voidable and thus potentially voicL which allowed New Phase 
Investments to feel secure in taking subsequently executed and recorded deeds of trust and asserting 
a first priority lien. 
22 R., p. 435 (Exhibit A to verified Second Amended Complaint) 
)' 
--' R., p. 509, L. 1 (Exhibit A to Affidavit of Megan Ker) 
11 
as a was as 
The title 
followed the state title "pr"yrrprI m Commitment for Amerititle. 
Notably, the defines "'Insured" not to an Idaho 
corporation," (the insured listed in Schedule but also " ... each succcssor ownership of the 
mdebtedness. ,,25 Onder this provision as a successor ovmer of the indebtedness from Jarvis, 
IS an insured the 
As on the 
summer due and payable under the to 26 
and his \\ife to Phasc Investments 
(closed, it should be ), a straightforward f(.)reclosure was not possible. Rather 
forec lose on a pursuant to general understanding 
to 
nC)'pmpnl under the policy. 
3 , on 23, 
Inc., both testified that they never 
or to interests trust or to 
represent their interests in other way. Instead. consistently requested that Stc\vart Title pay 
24 pp. 438-450 (Exhibit B to verified Second Amended Complaint), p. 429 18-19 
25 R, p. 447, ~ l(e)( 1 (Exhibit B to verified Second Amended Complaint) 
26 R., p. 342, ~ 7 (Affidavit of David Patterson) 
27R 4'101ll')4'fR '10,r;16 d '°1'')') 
., p. ,1 , II"" ,c. ., p.) L., Ii ), an pp.)L. -)~_). 
21) p. 430, ~ 25. 
12 
the they as In 
Instead under the , Stevvmt Title retained counsel to represent 
and Snake Funding in an effort to remedy or "establish" the title. The Policy gives 
Stewart Title the right. in addition to the options contained in paragraph 7 set out below, to institute 
and pursue action to "establish the or the lien of the Insured MOltgage. as insured." including 
the right to appeal judgment or order.,·30 paragraph 7, Stewart Title also is given 
to or ., to "Purchase the Indebtedness, or 
to or the other the Insured. J 1 There appears to be no 
other provision that deals the interaction of these several different options. 
Despite the hiring counsel by Title, for various reasons, including two 
bankruptci es' the was not initiated shortly after 
tiling 10. from the Claim. That 
litigation occupied years. resulting in a delay approximately after Jarvis's 
default to s errors at 
During that four continued to accrue on the note. Instead of having a relatively 
12 long, and 12 
times the interest accrued, eroding the relati ve value ofthe security for the loan. Moreover, 
as is well known to virtually every adult in this country, during that time period from mid-2008 until 
mid-2012, the real estate market nationwide. especially the residential real estate market took a 
serious beating, also dramatically reducing the value 's security. 
29 R., pp. 341-342, 343A (AfIidavit of David Patterson, Affidavit of Darin Hebdon (Second) 
30 R .. p. 448, ~ 5(b)(c) 
31 R., p. 448, ~ 7(a)(b) 
13 
to 
so court an amendment to restate claims against Amerititle and 
Title in light the inrestments decision because of the age of the case. Did the 
court abuse its discretion when it was necessary to wait for the decision in Phase Investments 
before proceeding? 
Idaho a court to deny to amend a complaint w·hen the amended 
not set out a negligence claims against 
faith claims. negligence and bad faith claims against the 
the trial court abuse discretion denying leave to amend on the ground that 
asserted merit? 
"\ 
.J. The covenant fair dealing is part of insurance contracts in 
see that Stewart 10 
its damages under the policy. allowing 
a 
and 
3. not but 
beneficiaries. The Closing Instructions between Snake River Funding and Amerititle 
contemplated an immediate assignment of the loan to which actually occurred. Was it 
improper to deny summary judgment to DAFCO against Amerititle for lack of privity? 
seeks its attorney fees on appeal pursuant to Idaho Code § 1 120(3) (commercial 
transaction). 
14 
In Hines v. Hines. 129 Idaho 847. 853. 934 20. 27 (Idaho 1997) the Idaho Surpeme 
Court explained the long-standing rules the Court regarding decisions to grant or to refuse 
permission to amend a complaint It stated: 
the decision to grant or refuse permission to amend a complaint is left to sound 
discretion of the trial court when a party proposes to amend its complaint after a 
responsive pleading is served. l.R.c.P. 15(a): Jones v. Watson, 98 Idaho 606. 570 
P.2d 284 (1977). \Ve also recognize that this Court has determined that a trial court 
properly refuses permission to amend a complaint \vhen the record contains no 
allegations that, ifproven. would entitle party to the relief claimed. 
Racquetball Club. Inc. v. Idaho First Naf'! Bank, 119 Idaho 17]. 804 P.2d 
(1991). Nonetheless, as this Court indicated in lFickstrom v. North Idaho 
111 Idah0450,725P 155(1 inthemterest' 
t~tvor liberal grants of leave to amend a complaint. 
,\Vhen reyiewing an exercise of discretion, a court on appeal conducts a three-tiered inquiry. 
The lower court must have (I) the issue as one of discretion, \\'ithin the 
outer boundaries of its discretion consistently with legal standards applicable to specific choices 
ayailabJe to it, and ) reached its conclusion an exerCIse reason. Dunagan v. Dunagan, 147 
Idaho 599, 213 P.3d 384 (2009). 
Regarding the second of the inquiry, some of the legal standards applicable are set forth 
in Hines v. Hines, most basic of these legal standards is that district courts should favor 
liberal grants of leave to amend a complaint. Hines, supra. This requirement is set forth explicitly 
in LR.C.P. J 5(a) as follows: "[L ]eave shall be freely given when justice so requires." 
15 
m ruling on the motions before it at the hearing held 1 
the emphasized how long this case had been pending. and concern about the time 
guidelines imposed on trial courts by the Supreme Court. 
So there's an extended history on this case, and it appears that the parties in 
some regard may have been idle mvaiting the decision. but nonetheless this is a case 
that has been pending since 2010 early. And so when we reach triaL it will have been 
a number of years, \vhich far exceeds the time standards that are imposed upon this 
Court for resolution. And there are those cases that have taken this kind of time. but 
at the nature cases to a as to \vhether or not it 
diligently pursued. 
. p. 77, 
The 
calendar and 
, p. . ] 
on 
udicial to 
this case 
9 . 
its viev, and the pressures it feels from its case management and 
guidelines set forth by the Supreme Court that it can't go backwards. 
. it appears on nothing else, the trial court that it 
the complaint. the Court finds that 
to the p. 
m 
The never states vvhat the prejudice to the defendants actually would be if there were 
an amendment, amount of time. The court was obviously conc'~rnleu with 
additional delay, but it never discussed how short or how long the delay would be, or what the 
practical or legal consequences of that delay would be on the defendants. The trial court mentions 
the New Phase Investment case and the need to wait for a decision, but once that decision was made, 
was unwilling to discount the time lost during that wait and was unwilling to even consider the effect 
that decision had on the posture of this case. 
Remarkably, the trial court was willing to allow Stewart Title a period of four years to sort 
out the title to the property, finding that it had proceeded "diligently," even though the prejudice to 
]6 
of as interest on note and y-,r,H",PrTV values 
same it was um,illing to conflict 
to put its claims in line \vith the new legal realities of interest its prior counseL even a short 
after the s surpnsmg 111 Phase Invcstmel1ls. 
The failure to address the specific prejudice to be experienced by Amerititle (which did not 
even file an answer to the Second Amended Complaint until after the decision in New Phase 
) or to was a of third tier of the inquiry conducted by this 
to the court 
cases, not on the 
the 
and perhaps 
that 
the 
court 
court seems to the prejudice 
the applIcation the Supreme Court guidelines on the resolution of 
or interests of justice parties. 
are 
new 
Still, though, the court said that the claims had, in essence, no legal merit. This confusion, failure 
to address the merits of the new claims themselves instead of the claims set forth in the second 
amended complaint is also a violation of the third tier of inquiry under the abuse of discretion 
standard. which requires that the result be reached as a result of an exercise of reason. 
The claims pending under the Second Amended Complaint, which were the subject of the 
summary judgment motions, were purely contractual claims under the Policy (against Stewart Title) 
and the Closing Instructions (against Amerititle). In contrast, the claims to be added under the 
17 
v;ere: (1 a 
se, in the manner that it 
and the Lenders: negligence and for bad faith (both tort claims) arising from the 
manner in \vhich Stewart Title responded to and handled the claim filed by under the 
Policy: and (3) a claim for breach of warranty against Snake River Funding. 
(Snake Funding did not even appear at the hearing, presumably because the hearing 
scheduled on the motion to amend \vas scheduled for the follO\ving \vcck. The trial court, without 
including hearing of the motion to amend and 
considered it together the motions summary Judgment.) 
any there is good authority for all of the claims sought to add against the 
defendants. 
a 
a cause 
administrative 
on set 
negligence and 
regulations that 
Title Have Legal Merit. 
to be established by showing 
establish the first two elements 
that, 
are not precluded from bringing a private cause of m 
statutes and even gomgso as to state 
that the "statutory scheme to regulate the insurance industry fails to provide sufficient incentive" 
alone to prevent \'VTongs, therefore allowing private claims to be based on such statutes (such as bad 
faith or negligence. 
() 'C;uin v. Bingham County, 142 Idaho 49, 52 122 P.3d 308, 311 (2005). 
" VVhite v. Unigard iHut. Ins. Co., 112 Idaho 94. fn 3730 P.2d 1014, fn 3 (1986) 
18 
are in nature. and that in to 
an escrov,; IS for to these 
common law duties, there are statutory and regulatory duties as set forth escrow agents the 
Idaho Escrow and for companies governed under the Idaho Department and 
those statutes36 and the related regulations. 37 In addition. in Idaho. the statutes and regulations 
regarding insurance are incorporated into and/or are to be consistent \vith the agreements with the 
insured. 38 
The duties 
in the setting forth ms of negligence and per se negligence as it pertained to Amerititle's and 
Stewmi Title's conduct as title insurance and escrow 111 those role, 
Amerititle and Stewart Title had a duty 10 comply statutes and regulations governing escro\v 
duties and the issuance including regulations issued the Idaho Department 
se. 
violated include failing to conduct 
to to 
proper execution, ackno\vledgmenL mortgage papers, and other 
34 See All American ReallY at 1357-58, 1. 
35 Idaho Code § 30-901 et seq. 
36 Idaho Code §41-101et 
37 IDAPA 18.01.25 
38 See, e.g., Hansen v. State Farm A1ut. Auto. Ins. Co., 735 P.2d 974.980-81 (Idaho 
1987) ; Hovvard v. Blue Cross of Idaho Health Service. Inc., 757 P.2d 1204, 1207 (Idaho App. 
1987). H(~ffman v. SV Co., 628 P.2d 218,221 (Idaho 1981). 
19 
instruments lssuance a to a 
4() 
These claims to its o\'vn instructions by 
obtaining s Title failed to ensure 
the documents had been properly prior to issul11g a policy 
2. The Breach of Warranty ('lainl against 5'nake River Funding Has Legal /vferit 
conflict interest to the plaintiff's initial. counsel, ,"vas a 
to 
HI it agreed to indemnify 
s interest in the to harmless against threats to 
s il1terest in the 
cl . 1t is undisputed that Corporate 
merit, 
to recuse himself. 
was 
\vas t\\:o parties had resolved. separate 
an to 
received from prior counsel. 
The trial court erred in not even addressing this particular claim \vhatsoever in his ruling 
denying DAFCO's motion to amend the complaint. It is apparent from the record that the court was 
anxious to this case v"ithout further deliberations or proceedings, and notwithstanding 
39 IDAPA 18.01.25.005.C)1.d 
40 IDAPA 18.01 .011.01 
the 
on 
3. 
Funding's 
to 
The Breach of the 
Claim have ;\1erit 
\vas not at ILA"au:,, __ the hearing 
one 
Faith and Dealing Contractual and Tort 
DAFCO's Second Amended Complaint included claims for breach of contract against both 
Amerititle ( the Escro\v Agreement) and Stewart Title (under the title policy). Howevec after 
the Court issued under Phase Invcstments, a bad faith tort claim against 
also became ripe, the basis adding such claim to Third 
Complaint. 
Title are contracts insured and their insurers" and should interpreted 
treated as such under 41 that is governed by the insurance statutes 
regulations, \vhich make it subject to the strict requirements, that is, the "special 
relationship the 1I1surer and "the ofwhich gi ves rise to a bad 
type faith claim, or breach covenant faith and f~ljr IS a the 
yiolation can 111 contract damages.n 
or that exists bet\veen insurer and 
claim an 1I1surer \vere out v. Alut 
Ins. 44 bad faith claim lies against an msurer 111surer intentionallv and 
unreasonably denies or \vithholds payment: the claim is not fairly debatable; 3) the denial or 
failure to pay is not the result of a good f~J.ith mistake: and 4) the resulting harm is not fully 
compensable by contract damages. 
41 Boel v. Stewart Title Guar. 
4c h I W itc v. Unigan Ahll. Ins. 
43 Id. 
insurer's failure to timely respond to and defend its insured 
,] Idaho 
112 Idaho 
11-1 43 P.3d 768, 773 (2002) 
730 P.2d 10]4 (1986) 
44 13 7 Idaho 173, 176 (Idaho 2002) 
21 
IS a t~lith the standards set in the 
Settlement can serve as a basis for bad faith.47 
among other things: 
"failing to acknuwledge and act reasonably promptly upon communications \vith 
respect to claims arising under insurance policies;" Sec. (2) 
"not attempting in good faith to etlectuate prompt, fair and equitable settlements of 
ms 111 which liability has become reasonably clear;" Id. at and 
to has become reasonably clear, under 
one portion insurance policy coverage 111 order to 111i1uence settlements under 
other portions insurance policy." ld. (13) 
In addition. title insurcrs who also conduct escrow services may also be liable for bad faith 
111 providing escrow may include a failure of the escrow officer act 
honesty. skilL and examples of actions that constitute bad faith 
an escrow agent may a failure of preparing the documents 
to 
some the instant case facts and holdings 
Prudential Prop su nelr1enCll1g injuries from an UU.CU.LUV'UL 
~5 Sec Weinstein v. Prudential Prop. & Cas. llZs. Co., 149 Idaho 299, 314 (Idaho 2010) 
46 Idaho Code 41-1329 et seq. 
47 White v. Unigard Ins. 112 Idaho at fn 3, 730 P2d at fn 3 
48 Baker 1'. First Am Title Ins. Co., 2009 Ariz. App. LEXIS 823, 17-18 (Ariz. App. 
27,2009) 
49 See 
Dep't 1988) 
Realty v. 142 A.D.2d 514 App. Div. 1st 
50 Weinstein v. Prudential Propert), and Cas. Ins. Co, 149 Idaho 299,233 P.3d 1221 
(2010) 
v. 
a motorist 
though the insurer the motorist \vas 
in the accident and that the insured \vas covered under the policy, insured's 
medical bills it instead decided to treat the insured the same it treat at 
fault, that is, but not paying anything under the uninsured motorist provisions of the policy until it 
was ready to settle all claims under the policy.'] In other vvords, the insurer believed that it 
needed to pay medical bills incurred bv its untIl it had all medical bills and other 
before it. This in significant 111 
which had devastating consequences on the insured. 52 
The Weinstein court held that msurer's approaeh and conduct, \vhich resulted in the 
substantial delays, constituted not a contractual breach of the covenant good faith and 
dealing, but a bad faith t011 as 53 held that, once the insurer the determination 
uninsured \vas at fault, it should simply 
Failing to costs as they were 
as covenant 
conduct constituted an "intentional and unreasonable 
faith.55 so the 
make payments under the coverage until the 
the medical bills \vere undisputed. ,,56 
5] Jd. at 31 18.233 P.3d at 1 240 
52 Jd. at 308. 233 P.3d at 1230. 
53 Jd 316-317,233 P.3d at 1238-1239 
S4 Jd at 318, 233 P.3d at 1240 
5S ld 
56 ld at 319. 233 P.3d at 1241 
the were submitted. 
a reasonable time, 
54 such 
in payment" that proved the tort of bad 
s was not to 
claim was settled. even liability and 
this case, IS l!l a similar to the' 111 
made an the that the a to 
Instead of being promptly paid its damages under the policy. it \vas to endure years of 
litigation \vhile the its Title pursues one its alternatives 
under the polIcy. an alternative that is vastly superior from Ste\vart Title's perspective. but has 
disastrous consequences for StewaI1 Title is likewise in a situation quite analogous to 
Liberty It determined that seeking a determination whether a voidable deed 
\vas actually ignoring its 
as the insurer. 
at the 
thus had little' 
even if it \\as 
then pursued 
its 
had an oblIgation to the policy anyway. 
to just the policy and take an assignment of the note and deed 
with an uncertain outcome. 
rather than subjecting to this delay and the 
mcome, use money, that the title was 
simply paid the claim as one 
an mortgage and 
it desired on its o\vn behalf. ":>C'vet,",", it put economic interests 
a the 
fiduciary duty inherent the relationship between insurer and insured req uires that Stevvart Title not 
simply choose the option that best benefits its own self, to the detriment of its insured. To do so 
constitutes bad faith. 
It was enor in essence, to summarily dismiss this meritorious claim. 
is 
The Idaho Supreme Court quite recently reiterated the oft-cited standards to be applied on 
appeal of an order granting summary judgment to the moving party. Inc. v. KDC 
InVCSlmcnls,57 writing a unanimous court Justice Horton explained: 
This exercises novo grant of summary judgment and the 
"standard of reVIew is the same as the standard used by the trial eourt in ruling on a 
motion for summary judgment" Stol1ebrook Cons(, LIC 1'. Chase Home Fin, LLC, 
1 Idaho 927, 929, 277 P.3d 374, 376 (2012) (quoting Curlee 1'. Kootenai 
Fire & Rescue, 148 Idaho 391, 394, 224 P.3d 458, 461 (2008». Summary judgment 
is proper if "the pleadings, depositions, and admissions on file, together with the 
aHidavits. if any. show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that 
the movmg party is entitled to a judgment as a matter law. ,-
applying this standard. this Court construes disputed facts "in favor of the non-mov-
ing party, and all reasonable inferences that can be drawn from the record are drawn 
in favor of the non-moving party" Curlee, 148 Idaho at 394, 224 P.3d at 461. Where 
"the evidence reveals no disputed issues of material fact, then only a question oflaw 
remains, over which this Court exercises free review:' Lockheed ,Harlin Corp v. 
Idaho Stale Tax Comm 142 Idaho 790. 793, ] 34 P.3d 641, 644 (2006) (citing 
Infcznger v. of Salmon, 137 Idaho 45,44 P.3d 1100 (2002)). However, to survive 
summary judgment adverse party may not rest upon the mere allegations or 
denials of that party's pleadings, but the party's response, by affidavits or as 
otherwise provided in this rule, must set forth specific facts show-ing that there is a 
genuine issue for trial. 56( c). Therefore, "the nonmoving patiy must submit 
more than just conclusory assertions that an issue of material fact exists .... " Jenkins 
v. Boise Cascade COlp., 14] Idaho 233, 238, 108 P.3d 380, 385 (2005) (citing 
NortJnvest Bec-COl]J. F Home Living Sen'., 136 Idaho 835, 839, 41 P.3d 263, 267 
(2002). "A mere scintilla of evidence or only slight doubt as to the facts is not 
sufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact for the purposes of summary 
judgment:' Jd 58 
57 A ED, Inc v. KDC Investments, Idaho P3d _,13.16 ISCR 10 (2013 Opinion 
88, August 15,2013) 
58 Id, 13.16ISCRat12-13;SlipOp.3--4. 
considering the claims against the trial court completely Ignored the holding 
Weinstein 1'. Prudential that a breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing, that is, bad faith, 
constitutes both a breach of contract and a tort. the court stated, 
It 
Although the tort of bad faith is not a breach of contract claim, to find that Liberty 
Mutual committed bad faith in handling the provision, there must also have been 
a duty under the contract that was breached. [Citation omitted.] Thus. both the breach 
of contract claim and the bad faith claim depend upon the provisions of the insurance 
po]' 59 
contains options In the event of a claim. as \yell as several obligations. 
obligation to defend claim that impugns s title, as insured. 
institute action to establish the title. It may pay on the policy to It may purchase 
s indebtedness. It may settle \\ith the third It could settle with 
to made within that "liability 
been definitively ·,/)1 there is no overall time frame in the 
such a contractual time frame, law the 
contract is IS a time" 
111 the nature act, situations, 
surrounding .63 This kind determination is ultimately a question for the trier of 
fact and in the situation summary judgment, as stated above, the court must construe all disputed 
facts in favor of the non-moving party, and all reasonable inferences that can be drawn from the 
59 Weinstein, supra, 149 Idaho at 315,233 P.3d at 1 7 
60 R., p. 448, 5, 7 
6] R., p. 449, ~ 11 
62 Ohray v. A1itchell, Idaho 533, 567 P.2d 1284 (1977) 
63 Culp v. TTi-County Tractor, Inc., 112 Idaho 894, 736 P.2d 1348 (Ct. App. 1987) 
are 111 terms. IS IS 
no aJury IS It more mere 
affIdavits to determine appropriately. 
The trial court emphasized that the only timeliness duty the insurer. it has opted to 
pursue litigation. is to pursue it "diligently. Howevcr. there are more duties inherent in the policy 
than merely defending the insured and establishing title. There is the overarching duty of 
indemnifying the insured against actual monetary loss or he sustains.64 that needs to 
a msurer cannot to cxtent 
or damage." Whether or not it did so this case IS. inherently. a question fact, independent 
of the obhgation to pursue litigation 
While the litigation was ongoing. Snake 
objecting to the ongoing litigation 
. Ste\vart 
reasonable to do so. 
IS a the 
For that rcason, the courfs 
to 
should not have been granted. 
64 R., p. 449, ~ 8. 
\\"ere 
extent 
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Funding and were consistently 
that paid their damages under the 
to litigate . or not it was 
to act good faith and to the 
litigation etTorts to the 
was error, 
It is clear from a reading of the coures oral ruling on the summary judgment motions that the 
basis for the court's holding on Amerititle's motion for summary judgment was lack of privity. an 
argument that Amerititle raised in its reply brief filed only one day before the hearing on the motion. 
The court thus lacked complete briefing on that issue. and it its efforts to bring this matter to a 
overlooked current status of defenses. 
long ago as 1 as general a treatise on the as Blacks Lavv' was able to 
, about the concept of privity: 
Ho\\ever, the absence privity as a defense in actions f()r damages in contract and 
tort actions is genaally no longer viable the enactment of warranty statutes (see 
. U § 2-318 below), acceptance by states the doctrine of strict liability 
l' and court decisions MacPherson v. Buick Motor 217 N.V. 382, III 
1050) which the right to sue for injuries or damages to third party 
beneficiaries, and even innocent bystanders (Elmore v. American Motors Corp., 70 
CaL2d Cal.Rptr. 1 P.2d 65 
the and closing process for real estate transactions has, at its 
the local title was at the hub of this transaction. It issued the commitment 
insurance. It the for this transaction, including the 
deed ohrust, the the assignment the deed of trust to and the closing instructions. 
It even acted as agent for Stewart Title in issuing the title policy in accordance with its title 
commitment and the closing documents. 
Amerititle was fully aware that \vas to be assigned the deed of trust and note. It was 
aware that funded the loan transaction, and that Snake River Funding was acting in the role 
65 BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (Sixth Ed. 1990),p.1l99. 
28 
loan broker rather than a It was vvith the Title policy 
an msured under the once it was assigned the from other 
that Snake Funding \'1:as just a conduiL not real party in interest 
on the s side of this transaction. ultimate assignee, and the ultimate beneficiary of all 
the rights under the contracts and the actions undertaken by Amerititlc, \vould be 
In that context. there is at the least a question of t~lCt as to whether there was privity of 
contract and as to the closmg escrow agreements. including the Closing 
at as to whether was an 
intended beneficiary those agreements. or Funding was, in effect. acting as 
the agent for at the executing the documents. 
The court's failure to examine all ofthese additional arguments, possibly excused by the late 
m the briefing In lssue was was errol'. 
The trial court was as more than a 
"scnvener" in Nothing could from the truth. 
The escrovv s escrow are explained in All 
maicon Realty. . v. Idaho 13 ] 357 (l (citing Am 
Id. 
Where a person assumes to and does act as depositary in escrow, he is absolutely 
bound by the terms and conditions of the deposit and charged with a strict execution 
of the duties voluntarily assumed. is held to strict compliance with the terms of 
the escrow agreement: and he may not perform any acts with reference to handling 
the deposit or its disposal, which are not authorized by the contract of deposit 
In addition, as set forth in detail above, there are numerous statutory and regulatory 
requirements that bind an escrow agent to perform more than merely scrivener's duties. The escrow 
is essentially, in effect, a form of fiduciary with responsibilities to both parties to ensure that the 
29 
terms of the escrow are 1~lithfully performed, in this case, 
interest might 
duty to obtain 
signatures such as the being 
and were instructed to and agreed to do as part of the Closing Instructions. 
For those reasons, granting summary judgment to Amerititle \vas errOL 
ON 
a party. including on appeal, when the gravamen 
from a commercial transaction. The transaction in question is clearly a 
commercial For the reasons set fOl1h above, asserts that it should be the 
prevailing party in this appeal. Attorney fees on appeal should be awarded to DAFCO. 
all the 
its 
should be REVERSED and 
reasons, the deciSIOn of the trial court denying the ability to 
and granting the title companies' motions for summary jUdgment 
to the trial court for further proceedings. 
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DATED this 13 
PETERSEN 
I hereby certify that I am a duly attorney in the State Idaho, with my office in 
Idaho Falls, Idaho, and that on the 30th of August, 2013, served t\\'o true and correct copies 
the foregoing document on the belmv class the correct postage 
thereon. 
Richard 
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Box 9 
Boise. 10 702 
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